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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
WAYNE WARDLE, ] 
Defendant and Appellant. 
i C'.aso No. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Defendant-Appellant hereby petitions this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2a-4 and Rule 45, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to issue a writ directing the 
Court of Appeals to certify the decision and record in the above-entitled case to this 
Court for review. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Was there prejudicial error in allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine 
the Defendant regarding business dealings without buttressing his remarks with 
admissible extrinsic evidence? 
2. Did the district court err in refusing to give the Defendant's proposed 
"reasonable alternative hypothesis" instruction in light of the language of the "reasonable 
doubt" instruction? 
OPINION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this matter is unpublished. A copy 
of the slip opinion is attached hereto as Appendix A. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The decision of the Court of Appeals was filed on June 15,1990. Appellant 
timely filed a Petition for Rehearing which was denied on September 11,1990. This Court 
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-4, and the petition was timely filed 
pursuant to Rule 48, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the Case. Defendant was convicted of aggravated arson and insurance 
fraud in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding. 
b. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Lower Courts. Defendant was tried and 
convicted of aggravated arson and insurance fraud. The district court entered judgment 
on the charge of aggravated arson as a second degree felony and the Defendant was 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than 15 years in 
the Utah State Prison. He was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one 
year nor more than 15 years in the charge of insurance fraud, the sentences to run 
concurrently. The Defendant was then granted a stay of the execution of the prison 
sentences and placed on probation in the custody of the court and under supervision of 
the Department of Adult Parole and Probation for a period of 18 months. 
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c. Statement of Facts. In October 1986, the Defendant was the proprietor of a small 
business engaged in the repair and maintenance of lawn sprinkler systems. The 
business was housed in an old home located at 395 West 5900 South in Murray, Utah. 
(T.41,73) 
On Monday, October 20,1986, the Defendant went to his place of business 
at approximately 6:45 a.m. He later told investigators he was there for the purpose of 
doing some miscellaneous bookkeeping. The Defendant left the premises at 
approximately 7:15 or 7:20 a.m. locking the door behind him. (T.74-75) The Defendant 
and his wife were the only persons in the possession of keys to the building. (T. 76) 
At 7:44 a.m. the local fire department was advised that the Defendant's 
building was burning. Fire fighters were at the location by 7:48 a.m. and the fire was 
under control by 7:59 a.m. (T. 22-25) 
After the fire had been extinguished, investigators from various public 
agencies and from the Defendant's insurance carrier, Ohio Casualty Insurance, examined 
the premises and attempted to determine the point of origin and the cause of the fire. 
Dean Larsen, assistant chief and fire marshall, Murray City Fire Department, 
was the first investigator on the scene. He testified that he located what he believed to 
be the point of origin of the fire near a desk in the northeast quadrant of the building. 
(T. 42-48) He eventually located a soldering iron, the tip of which was lying on the floor 
and had burned through the carpet and the pad "into the subflooring with an indentation 
of approximately half an inch deep char into the floor." (T. 52) 
Because it was obvious that the soldering iron was located near the point 
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where the fire had originated and had been in contact with the floor for a substantial 
period of time the State's experts theorized that the instrument had been used as a timing 
device or had been intentionally planted as a "decoy." (T 98-99) Consequently, a 
substantial part of their investigation would revolve around an experimentation to 
determine whether or not the soldering iron could have started the fire and under what 
circumstances. 
Larsen opined that there may have been some type of flammable liquid 
used because he observed what he characterized as irregular burn patterns in the carpet 
indicating that for some reason the heat of the fire had remained low and to the floor in 
various locations. (T. 53-54) He also stated that it appeared that the soldering iron had 
been placed on the floor "and that something had been set on top of it so that the tip 
would stay in the position touching some combustible material, and some flammable 
materials put around it to accelerate it." (T. 64) Based upon these observations he 
concluded that the fire was intentionally set. 
Larsen acquired a soldering iron similar to the one recovered at the scene 
of the fire. He dropped the soldering iron on the floor 15 to 20 times in order to 
determine whether or not the tip would come to rest in contact with the carpeting. He 
testified: "I wasn't able to do that. Every time it landed on the handle and not on the tip." 
(T. 66; See also T. 92, 127) 
He then performed a test wherein he heated the soldering iron and placed 
paper on top of it to see if the paper would ignite. He testified that it would not ignite 
unless he first moistened the paper with lighter fluid. (T. 66-67) 
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Finally, he left the soldering iron on for approximately four days to see if the 
handle would burn away or the instrument would fail for some other reason. It did not. 
(T.67) 
John Blundell testified that he examined the scene of the fire at Larsen's 
request. (T. 157) He independently located the same point of origin. (T. 159-160) He 
also felt that burn patterns in the carpet "had the appearance of the possibility of a 
flammable liquid being present." (T. 170) 
Blundell then spent some time ruling out an electrical malfunction as the 
cause of the fire. (T. 160-164) 
He testified that after concluding his examination of the scene of the fire: 
". . . at least in my mind I wasn't certain that this was an intentionally set fire or an 
accidentally caused fire. So that's why the other two individuals spent a lot of time 
looking at soldering irons and conducting experiments associated with them." (T. 172) 
Blundell did not personally conduct any experiments involving the soldering irons nor was 
he present when any tests were conducted. (T. 167-168) 
Blundell conceded that in his opinion the soldering iron could have started 
the fire if a paper sack or some other combustible material had fallen onto the iron and 
encapsulated the heat. (T. 181) 
James A. Ashby was retained by Ohio Casualty Insurance for the purpose 
of investigating the fire. (T. 207) His investigation lead him to conclude that the burn 
patterns in the carpet may have been attributable to radiant heat and not an indication 
of the use of any flammable liquid. (T. 210, 280) He opined that the irregular burn 
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patterns in the carpet were likely caused by the presence of paper or the disintegration 
of the wall paneling. (T. 257, 283-284) As Ashby explained it: "Or in particular, I was 
worried about the paneling material, because it very quickly delaminates and peals off the 
wall and drops these burning embers in that area. And those burning embers can cause 
heavy carpet destruction as well." (T. 283) 
Ashby also conducted tests using a pencil type soldering iron. Ashby 
discovered that when dropped from a table the soldering iron usually came to rest with 
the tip down and in contact with the carpet. (T. 216-217, 219) 
In addition to the testimony of these three witnesses, the State produced 
evidence of the presence of a light range hydrocarbon in two of the five carpet samples 
taken from the scene of the fire. (T. 130) The State chemist testified that he detected the 
hydrocarbon by initially noting a "sweet odor" in two of the samples. (T. 131) Tests were 
then run on the gastromatography which indicated the presence of some kind of 
hydrocarbon although the chemist was unable to identify the substance or indicate in 
what quantity it was present. (T. 134) 
The Defendant testified and admitted that he had used a soldering iron three 
or four days before the fire. (T. 316-317, 329, 338) He denied having intentionally left the 
iron on and denied having intentionally set the fire. (T.324, 327-328) 
Sometime after the fire, the Defendant contacted a public adjuster who 
examined the premises and prepared a proof-of-loss statement for the Defendant's 
approval and signature. In December 1986 Defendant submitted a claim to Ohio 
Casualty in the amount of $24,984.75 and was ultimately paid $15,900.00 in settlement 
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of his claim. (T. 143-145) 
In December 1987, almost 14 months after the fire, criminal charges were 
initiated against the Defendant. Following his conviction, Defendant appealed to the Utah 
Court of Appeals which affirmed his convictions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS UNFAIRLY PREJUDICED BY UNWARRANTED 
ATTACKS RELATED TO HIS FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Over objection by Defendant's counsel, the prosecutor was allowed to 
question the Defendant regarding a host of issues related to his financial circumstances. 
(T. 342-345, 354-355) Defendant concedes that in a case involving arson with intent to 
defraud an insurer the prosecution may be allowed certain latitude in developing the 
defendant's motive through questions regarding his financial status, provided that the 
inquiry appears to have been made in good faith. See People v. Folsom. 34 Cal.Rptr. 
148 (1963). 
The prosecutor's cross-examination regarding "financial interest" follows: 
Q. [BY MR. JONES] Do you have any judgments against you? 
A. [BY MR. WARDLE] I don't believe --
MR. METOS: I'll object. I don't see the relevance of this. 
MR. JONES: Goes to financial interest, your honor. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: I'm not aware I do. 
Q. [BY MR. JONES] Did you have one involving Western General 
Dairies? 
A. I do or did. 
Q. Did you have a garnishment against your accounts? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Did you have a judgment involving a man named Gary Gavin? 
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A. No. 
Q. A lawsuit with him? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you owe him money? 
A. I don't know who Gary Gavin is. 
Q. Did you ever have any employees that sued you during that time 
A. I'm sure we have. 
Q. Did you change the name of your business about the time of the 
fire? 
A. We still have not completed the name change. It's in the - that 
process will take a few more years. 
Q. Did you start to change the name about the time of the fire? 
A. I think the year before. 
Q. Why were you changing the name? 
A. We were incorporating. 
Q. Why did you change the name? 
A. Because we were incorporating. 
Q. Did it have anything to do with lawsuits pending against you? 
A. Not at all. 
Q. Did you change the owner of the business? 
A. I'm still the primary owner. 
Q. Did you change the owner and put your wife as the owner? 
A. She's the president of the corporation. I'm a major stockholder. 
Q. She wasn't before the fire, was she? 
A. She still was. I'm still dba. 
Q. Did you change your checking account about the time of the fire? 
A. I changed it-which, on the Brighton? 
Q. Did you change it to Valley Bank? 
A. It still is. 
Q. At the time of the fire how much money did you have in your 
accounts at Valley Bank? 
A. I have no idea. 
Q. You didn't have anything, did you? 
A. I have to have something, otherwise they close it. 
Q. Had you transferred all of the money out of the Valley Bank 
account? 
A. I don't think we transferred any money. 
Q. Just used everything up that was in that account? 
A. Yeah, there was no point in leaving money in there. 
Q. And again that didn't have anything to do with lawsuits or any 
possible litigation? 
A. No. 
* * * 
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Q. [BY MR. JONES] Mr. Wardle, I'm a little confused. Are you telling 
the jury you didn't know you had a judgment? 
A. [BY MR. WARDLE] The way you asked the question, I don't know 
what you're asking. 
Q. I'm asking you, sir, did you ever have any judgments against you 
in a court of law? 
A. I think I've had probably five or six judgments against me through 
my history. 
Q. Starting when? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. And ending when? 
A. I don't have any current. 
Q. Did you have any in '86? 
A. I don't recall. I believe that I had a couple. 
Q. Well, which judgments do you recall having? 
A. The one that you mentioned, Western General Dairies for $762.00. 
They got a judgment by default and we did pay that. That was paid 
and satisfied at that time, I'm sure, because we paid it the day after 
we found out about it. And there was one for Conlee Company for 
Five or $6,000, for a supply bill we had paid, but Cindy down there 
got a little overzealous. And Frank did apologize, but I believe that's 
still on my record, because we simply haven't bothered to take it off. 
Q. So at the time of the fire did you have that judgment pending? 
A. No, it was never a judgment. It was already paid and satisfied, 
but it was never entered. 
Q. How many times have you been sued for civil judgments? 
MR. METOS: I'll object. We need to be more specific. If he 
had civil judgments pending and outstanding at the time, that may 
establish a motive. But if he had civil judgments in the past and 
satisfied them so what? 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q. [BY MR. JONES] Did you have any civil judgments pending or in 
effect at the time of this fire? 
A. I don't recall. 
MR. JONES: That's all. 
(T. 342-345; 354-355) 
When the court invited rebuttal the prosecutor declined. (T. 356) The State 
had succeeded in suggesting to the jury that (1) the Defendant had been sued civilly on 
numerous occasions; (2) that his bank accounts had been garnished; (3) that he had 
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changed his business name for the purpose of defrauding creditors; (4) that he had 
changed his bank account for similar purposes; and (5) that he had incorporated his 
business and designated his wife as president of the newly-formed corporation for the 
purpose of avoiding his creditors. 
Neither the Defendant's answers nor any rebuttal offered by the prosecutor 
suggests a good faith basis for these inquiries. 
The State's case was based entirely upon circumstance. The prejudicial 
effect of these attacks is amplified by the fact that the Defendant's credibility was not only 
the cornerstone of his defense, it was its sum and substance. 
In State v. Peterson. 722 P.2d 768 (Utah 1986), the defendant in a burglary 
prosecution was questioned about prior felony convictions. He admitted three 
convictions, but questioning about a 1978 felony conviction in Spokane drew three 
denials. In reversing the conviction, the Utah Supreme Court observed: 
On appeal, defendant argues that the prosecution's reference to 
other unproven felonies prejudiced his case since his defense was 
based solely on his credibility. He claims that the prosecutor's 
suggestions (by inference) that he was not telling the truth about his 
felony convictions would cause the jury to doubt his denial of the 
present charge. The concern is well-founded. Other courts have 
held that where a witness denies prior convictions, questioning on 
that subject is disallowed unless the questioner is prepared to 
present extrinsic proof of the convictions. The rule was explained in 
Kizer v. State. 67 Okl.Cr. 16, 93 P.2d 58 (1939), as follows: 
[IJmpeaching questions should not be propounded to 
a witness unless they are based upon facts that the 
interrogator intends to present in refutation of adverse 
answering of questions propounded; such line of 
questioning should be done in good faith, and not for 
the purpose of prejudicing and arousing suspicion of 
the jury against the defendant. 
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93 P.2d at 88. 
In the instant case, the trial court denied the motion for mistrial in 
finding that the prosecutor had acted in good faith. This finding was 
in error, however, in view of the prosecutor's failure to buttress his 
references to defendant's convictions with admissible extrinsic 
evidence (such as a certified copy of the conviction), [citation 
omitted]. 
722 P.2d at 769-770. 
State v. Singleton. 66 Ariz. 49,182 P.2d 920 (1947), was an appeal from a 
murder conviction. The "very heart" of the defendant's theory of self-defense lie in 
establishing his reputation for being a peaceable man. On cross-examination, the 
prosecutor asked the defendant three times whether or not he had threatened a third 
party by the name of Menacey. Three times the defendant denied it. The State 
contended that "this line of questioning was not put to lay the foundation for 
impeachment, but was designed to rebut defendant's claims of self defense and on that 
basis was both admissible and proper." 182 P.2d at 929. In reversing the conviction, the 
Arizona Supreme Court stated: 
[W]hen, as here, such questioning is raised and then dropped with 
no further attempt on the part of the State to prove its point, the 
aforementioned "fishing expedition" having failed, we believe it to be 
wholly improper and highly prejudicial. To allow this sort of 
examination would be to allow the imaginative and overzealous 
prosecutor to concoct a damaging line of examination which could 
leave with the jury the impression that defendant was anything that 
the questions, by innuendo, seemed to suggest. If the questions 
were persistent enough and cleverly enough framed, no amount of 
denial on the part of a defendant would be able to erase the 
impression in the mind of the jury that the prosecutor actually had 




In the instant case the Defendant was asked if he owed money to a 
gentlemen by the name of Gary Gavin. He denied it. He was asked whether or not he 
had engaged in litigation with Gavin. He denied it. He was asked whether or not his 
business name was changed as a result of pending lawsuits. He denied it. He was 
asked if he had redistributed the ownership of his business with similar motives. He 
denied it. He was asked if he had changed banks and checking accounts. He denied 
any impropriety. He was asked whether or not any such changes had "anything to do 
with lawsuits or any possible litigation." He denied it. 
A relevant inquiry would have directly approached the Defendant's financial 
condition at the time of the fire. Instead, the prosecutor chose to paint the Defendant as 
dishonest in his business dealings and in his denial of the prosecutor's specific questions 
for which the jury would surely assume there existed a good-faith basis.1 
In the Court of Appeals the State suggested that the authorities cited by the 
Defendant should be distinguished because the impeachment in the instant case does 
not arise out of questioning involving prior felony conviction. Resp. Br. at 14-15. The 
Court of Appeals agreed. Slip opinion at 4. 
The condemnation of innuendo has never been limited to situations where 
the tactic is used to imply the existence of a prior criminal record. See ABA, Code of 
Professional Responsibility DR 7-106(C) (1); ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.7(d) ;2 
The prosecuting attorney may well be assumed to be a man of fair standing before the jury; and they may well have 
thought that he would not have asked the question unless he could have proved what it intimated if he had been allowed to do so.' 
People v. Wells, 100 Cal. 459, 462, 34 Pac. 1078, 1079 (1893). 
2 
"It is an improper tactic for the prosecutor to attempt to communicate impressions by innuendo through questions that 
would be to the defendant's advantage to answer in the negative, for example, 'Have you ever been convicted of the crime of 
robbery?' or "Weren't you a member of the Communist party?' or "Did you tell Mr. X that...?' when the questioner has no evidence 
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6 Wiamore. Evidence. Section 1808(2)(Chadboum rev. 1976). 
The prosecutor had succeeded in painting the Defendant as dishonest in 
his business dealings and in his denial of the prosecutor's specific questions for which 
the jury would surely assume there existed a good faith basis. The lack of good faith is 
demonstrated by the prosecutor's failure to buttress his remarks with admissible extrinsic 
evidence. See State v. Peterson, supra; see also, Tomarchio v. State. 99 Nev. 572, 665 
P.2d 804 (1983). 
The Court of Appeals disposed of this issue by noting that the Defendant 
"admitted having had five or six civil judgments against him." Slip opinion at 4. The 
opinion fails to consider the fact that the only obligation which was identified as a 
judgment at any time relevant to any financial motive for arson was a $762 judgment in 
favor of Western General Dairies. 
It has been said that cross-examination is the most effective machine 
devised for getting to the truth. Cross-examination by innuendo is the most effective 
machine devised for creating the illusion of truth and the illusion of effective impeachment. 
The power of innuendo lies in deception. It breeds suspicion and spawns skepticism. 
It cuts to the very core of a defense based primarily upon the accused's credibility. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED "REASONABLE HYPOTHESIS" 
INSTRUCTION. 
At trial, counsel proposed a jury instruction which would have advised the 
to support the innuendo." Comment, ABA, Standards of Criminal Justice 3-5.7. 
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jury that in a circumstantial evidence case the evidence must exclude "every reasonable 
hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the defendant". (R. 66) When the trial court 
failed to give this instruction exception was taken. (T. 407) 
Counsel is aware of the long line of Utah decisions holding that the trial 
court need not give a "reasonable alternative hypothesis" instruction so long as the jury 
is properly instructed regarding "reasonable doubt". See State v. Clayton. 646 P.2d 723 
(Utah 1982) (citing numerous cases). 
The Defendant does not claim personal knowledge of all of the 
circumstances which led to the fire. He was left to answer the charges by declaring his 
innocence and proposing possible explanations which incorporated the circumstances 
as he understood them to be. (T. 346-347) 
Instruction No. 3 advised the jury: "A reasonable doubt must be a real, 
substantial doubt and not one that is merely possible or imaginary." [Emphasis Added] 
(R. 93) 
It was error to refuse to give the proposed "reasonable alternative 
hypothesis" instruction where the "reasonable doubt" instruction suggested the 
inadequacy of a defense based upon "possible" explanations for the origin of the fire. 
In the Court of Appeals the State argued that the Defendant has waived his 
right to a review of the adequacy of the instructions given because trial counsel did not 
take exception to the "reasonable doubt" instruction. What the State fails to recognize is 
that the inadequacy of the "reasonable doubt" instruction would have been substantially 
cured had the proposed "reasonable alternative hypothesis" instruction been given. 
14 
The precise deficiency of which Defendant complains was recognized by 
Justice Stewart in his dissenting opinion in State v. Ireland. 773 P.2d 1375, 1382 (Utah 
1989): 
Finally, I submit that it is inappropriate to instruct that a reasonable 
doubt is not merely a possibility, as the instruction in this case does. 
Possibilities may or may not create doubt. Depending on the 
circumstances, a possibility may constitute a reasonable doubt. 
Whether a possibility is sufficient to create a reasonable doubt 
depends upon the likelihood of the possibility. Certainly a fanciful or 
wholly speculative possibility ought not to defeat proof beyond 
reasonable doubt. But the instruction does not make the point clear. 
An instruction that a reasonable doubt must be a "real, substantial 
doubt, and not one that is merely possible or imaginary" has been 
held to be erroneous because, in practical effect, it tends to diminish 
the prosecutor's burden of proof by implying that the prosecution 
need not obviate a real or substantial doubt. [Citation omitted] 
In my view, the trial court's instruction was clearly erroneous and 
ought to be so declared. 
In Ireland the majority affirmed the defendant's conviction but noted: 
We do acknowledge however, that the dissent's criticisms of the 
"more weighty affairs of life" language is justified and share Justice 
Stewart's concern that the "possible or imaginary" language might, 
by implication, be understood to diminish the prosecutor's standard 
of proof. Therefore, in our supervisory capacity, we direct the trial 
courts to discontinue use of that language in their instructions on the 
definition of reasonable doubt. 
773 P.2d at 1380. 
The problems discussed in Ireland are presented foursquare by the 
exception that was taken in the trial court. In the instant case, the Defendant does not 
claim personal knowledge of all of the circumstances which led to the fire. He was left 
to answer the charges by declaring his innocence and proposing possible explanations 
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which incorporated the circumstances as he understood them to be. Clearly the refusal 
to give the "reasonable alternative hypothesis" instruction was error where the "reasonable 
doubt' instruction suggested the inadequacy of a defense based upon "possible" 
explanations for the origin of the fire. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Defendant was unfairly prejudiced in 
cross-examination regarding fiancial matters which was calculated to destroy his 
credibility. A good faith basis for that line of questioning was never demonstrated. The 
decision of the Court of Appeals is at variance with State v. Peterson. 722 P.2d 768 (Utah 
1986). 
Finally, the inadequacy of the "reasonable doubt" instruction would have 
been substantially cured had the proposed "reasonable alternative hypothesis" instruction 
been given and the Defendant has preserved his right to appellate review of this issue 
by exceptions taken in the trial court. The decision of the Court of Appeals is at variance 
with State v. Ireland. 773 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1989). 
It is respectfully submitted that the Defendant's convictions should be 
reversed and the case remanded to the district court for a new trial. 
DATED this ^) day of October, 1990. 
_/sj 
Gary W. Pendleton 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Wayne Wardle, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
f $ L fc, D 
"JUN 151990 
OPINION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 890372-CA 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Attorneys: Gary Pendleton, St. George, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Sandra L. Sjogren, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
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JACKSON, Judge: 
Wayne Wardle appeals his jury convictions of aggravated 
arson, a first-degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-103 (1990), and insurance fraud, a second-degree felony 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-521 (1990). We affirm. 
Wardle raises five issues on appeal: (1) insufficiency 
of the evidence: (2) denial of due process; (3) improper expert 
testimony; (4) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (5) 
refusal of jury instruction. 
Wardle owned and operated A-l Maintenance in an old home 
in Murray, Utah. He was at the business for one-half hour the 
morning of October 20, 1986. About thirty minutes after he 
departed, the Murray City fire department was dispatched to the 
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business. The firefighters arrived four minutes later and 
found the building ablaze. 
Investigators agreed that the point of origin of the fire 
was adjacent to Wardle1s desk in his office area. They 
discovered a soldering iron next to his desk that had been 
burning for several days and had penetrated the carpet/ pad and 
one-half inch into the underlying particle board. The burn 
pattern around the iron was consistent with the use of an 
accelerant/ such as flammable liquid. Tests revealed the 
presence of a light range hydrocarbon/ an accelerant/ in the 
carpet. Investigators concluded that the fire was 
intentionally set. They concluded that the iron would not 
ignite flames without the aid of an accelerant or manipulation 
of a garbage bag to create a bellows effect. All investigators 
agreed that/ on that morning/ Wardle could not have avoided 
seeing or smelling the burning produced by the iron. 
Wardle's building was insured for $30/000. His one-year 
policy became effective three months prior to the fire. The 
insurance claims investigator described the building as a 
••shack" that could have been replaced for about $13/000. After 
the fire, Wardle says he was not too concerned about the 
building because he was planning to demolish it anyway, which 
he did for $450. He said he had received bids for demolition 
at $l/700-$l/800 and had a loan for a new building. He also 
stated that the fire did not affect his ability to continue in 
business because it was his off-season and there was little 
equipment or furnishings in the building. 
Wardle retained a public adjustor to prepare an insurance 
claim and filed his claim for $24/984.75. Wardle signed the 
proof of loss statement. The claim was settled for $15/900. 
We will examine the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the guilty verdicts on both charges. When reviewing a 
claim that the evidence was insufficient/ we must view the 
evidence and all inferences that may be drawn from it in the 
light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 
116/ 117 (Utah 1989). If there is evidence from which the jury 
could have found all the elements of the crime/ our inquiry 
must stop and the conviction must be affirmed. State v. 
Booker, 709 P.2d 342/ 345 (Utah 1985). 
First/ we will examine the evidence supporting the 
verdict of aggravated arson. Section 76-6-103(1) provides in 
relevant part: 
a person is guilty of aggravated arson if 
by means of fire or explosives he 
intentionally and unlawfully damages: 
(a) a habitable structure!!.] 
Three arson investigators examined the cause of the fire: Dean 
Larsen, Murray City fire marshall and assistant chief; John 
Blundell, at Larsen's request; and James Ashley, at the request 
of Wardle's insurer. Each testified that the fire was 
intentionally set. Further, the State chemist's discovery of 
hydrocarbon, a fire accelerant, in carpet samples was 
consistent with the investigators' determinations that the 
carpet burn patterns revealed the use of an accelerant. Wardle 
was on the premises shortly before the fire was discovered, and 
he was there at his desk when the smoldering soldering iron 
could not have been overlooked. The door was locked and Wardle 
had the keys. Wardle's only explanation for the fire was that 
he must have kicked or moved a paper sack full of garbage onto 
the smoldering iron that morning without noticing what he had 
done. The jury could reasonably conclude from the evidence 
before it that Wardle had intentionally started the fire. We 
find sufficient evidence in the record to support Wardle's 
conviction of aggravated arson. 
Next, we will examine the evidence supporting the verdict 
of insurance fraud. Section 76-6-521 provides: 
Every person who presents, or causes 
to be presented, any false or fraudulent 
claim, or any proof in support of any such 
claim, upon any contract of insurance for 
the payment of any loss, or who prepares, 
makes or subscribes any account, 
certificate of survey, affidavit or proof 
of loss, or other book, paper or writing, 
with intent to present or use the same, or 
to allow it to be presented or used, in 
support of any such claim is punishable as 
in the manner prescribed for theft of 
property of like value. 
Wardle submitted to Ohio Casualty Insurance Company a 
"Sworn Statement In Proof of Loss." The statement contains the 
following affirmation: "The said loss did not originate by any 
act, design or procurement on the part of the insured or this 
affiant." The document was duly subscribed and sworn to by 
Wardle. The jury, having found Wardle guilty of aggravated 
arson, could only conclude that the above affirmation was 
false. This evidence alone is sufficient to support Wardle's 
conviction of insurance fraud. Thus, we do not need to 
consider the State's claim that evidence of the inflated values 
listed in the proof of loss statement was sufficient to support 
the insurance fraud conviction. 
Wardle framed his due process argument as follows: 
"Defendant was denied due process as a result of unwarranted 
and prejudicial attacks upon his character and credibility.H 
His first complaint is that the State inappropriately used the 
insurance fraud count as a "vehicle for prejudicing the 
defendant." Wardle fails to cite a single authority in support 
of this point or to demonstrate that it constitutes a denial of 
due process. Wardle1s second due process complaint alleges 
unfair prejudice from "unwarranted attacks related to his 
financial circumstances." Again, Wardle has not cited any 
authorities which mention due process. The only Utah case 
cited is State v. Peterson, 722 P.2d 768 (Utah 1986), which is 
not on point. That case involved impeachment of a defendant 
based on prior criminal convictions. Here, Wardle was not 
asked about any prior criminal activity or convictions. He was 
asked about some civil judgments bearing on his financial 
condition prior to the fire, and he admitted having had five or 
six civil judgments against him. Wardle has failed to properly 
articulate his due process claim or cite supporting authority 
for this argument. We think that it was proper to inquire 
about Wardle's financial status as revealing a motive for arson 
and insurance fraud. See People v. Folsom, 220 Cal. App. 2d 
809, 34 Cal. Rptr. 148, 150 (1963). 
We turn next to Wardle's claim that his conviction was 
based on "improper 'expert' testimony." He complains about the 
following testimony: (1) Larsen was asked, "What is your 
theory of the case, how did this fire start?" He replied, "My 
opinion is that the soldering iron was put there prior to the 
actual fire itself; that it smoldered for quite some time 
without getting in complete combustion or the fire stage; that 
it was discovered by Mr. Wardle and that he accelerated it, put 
some type of flammable liquid on it to get it started and then 
left." (2) Ashby was asked whether he was "able to form some 
kind of theory as to what happened here?" He stated that the 
soldering iron was placed on the floor with a bag of garbage on 
Thursday, that Wardle went back to investigate, found the bag 
slow burning and used something to create an open flame and 
left. He believed the smoldering iron "would have been very 
noticeable, the smoke, the odor, something, something should 
have told Mr. Wardle that things were amiss." (3) Blundell 
summarized, "[B]asically what we're saying is that the 
defendant lied about what he found when he walked into the 
building that morning because smoke would have been present." 
Wardle directs us to Utah Rules of Evidence 704 and 403 as 
the basis for his argument that admission of the above 
testimony was "manifest error." Those rules provide: 
Rule 704. Opinion on ultimate issue. 
Testimony in the form of an opinion or 
inference otherwise admissible is not 
objectionable because it embraces an 
ultimate issue to be decided by the trier 
of fact. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence 
on ground of prejudice, confusion, or 
waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by 
consideration of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Wardle argues that this testimony from the experts should 
have been excluded because its probative value was 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues or misleading the jury. His argument 
simply regurgitates the language of the rule. Then he cites 
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989), as requiring 
reversal of his convictions "based upon the erroneous and 
prejudical admission of expert testimony."2 
Wardle undertook no analysis of Rimmasch as it relates to 
his case, but simply shared a quote from page 399: 
We remain wary of the potential of such 
evidence to distort the fact-finding 
process by reason of its superficial 
plausibility and its potential for 
inducing fact finders to accept expert 
judgment on critical issues rather than 
making their own. 
2. Besides Rimmasch, Wardle cites only State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 
89, 60 P.2d 952, 958 (1936), in support of his claim of 
"manifest error" based on improper expert testimony. 
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We note that Rimmasch treats Rules 608(a) and 702, which Wardle 
has not mentioned. Wardle argues further that the following 
rhetorical question by the prosecutor during closing argument 
suggested to the jury "that it may forego independent analysis 
of the facts" and decide the case on a single issue: 
Do you believe these three arson 
investigators when they reached the 
conclusion that this was an intentionally 
set fire, or do you believe the defendant 
when he says it was an accident? 
To us, this question sets the issue correctly as one of 
credibility. The parties each had a theory concerning the 
cause of the fire, i.e., intentional or accidental. The jury 
believed the experts and not Wardle. Credibility of witnesses 
is a matter for the jury to determine. State v. Baoley, 681 
P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984). 
Next, Wardle contends his trial counsel was ineffective, 
resulting in a denial of his sixth amendment rights. In 
evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we must 
determine that counsel's performance fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment and that defendant 
was prejudiced. State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989). 
First, Wardle contends that counsel should have objected to 
the prosecutor's insurance fraud theory and argument that 
Wardle*s proof of loss statement was inflated because that 
theory was unsupported by the evidence. However, Wardle 
ignores testimony that his building was valued at $13,000 and 
that he accepted $15,900 after submitting a claim for $25,000. 
Further, Wardle testified that he would have been happy to 
receive $5,000-$6,000 because he was not sure he had insurance 
and that was what he felt his loss was at the time. His proof 
of loss statement listed $544 for sheetrock when there was no 
sheetrock in the walls that burned. From this evidence, the 
prosecutor could properly argue that Wardle believed the value 
of his building to be about $6,000 and that his $25,000 claim 
was inflated and padded. Thus, an objection to the 
prosecutor's argument would not have been well taken. We find 
no deficiency in counsel's performance in this regard. 
Next, Wardle contends that counsel "was remiss in allowing 
the State to introduce, without objection, improper opinion 
evidence which was clearly prejudicial to defendant•H 
Prejudice is established where this Court's confidence in the 
verdict is undermined because there is a reasonable likelihood 
of a different result if counsel had not performed 
deficiently. State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217, 219 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). Assuming arguendo that counsel was deficient in 
not objecting to the experts' insertion of Wardle's name in 
their hypotheses as to how the fire started, we find no 
prejudice. Wardle was the last known person in the building 
prior to the fire. He was there shortly before the fire. An 
accelerant was applied to the fire. Wardle's failure to see or 
smell the smoldering iron next to his desk where the fire 
originated is inexplicable. We find it highly improbable that 
the jury found Wardle guilty because his name was mentioned by 
the experts. Wardle's "accident" explanation placed his 
credibility squarely at odds with that of the experts, even 
without Blundell's commentary on the divergent testimony. 
Because Wardle has not demonstrated prejudice, his conviction 
must stand. See State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
We have carefully considered Wardle's remaining claim 
regarding the trial court's failure to give a jury 
instruction,3 and we conclude it is meritless. 
Affirmed. 
Norman H. Jackson,^oudge 
3. The brief contains a single page of argument and cites a 
single case as follows: "See State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723 
(Utah 1982) (citing numerous cases)." 
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State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Wayne Wardle, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
ORDER qooud 
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This matter is before the Court upon a Petition for Rehearing 
filed by the appellant. Appellant argues in part that rehearing 
should be granted based on his belief that the reply brief was not 
considered by the Court. Although the reply brief was not docketed 
in the Court's computerized docketing system, the reply briefs were 
available and were considered by the panel. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing is denied. 
Dated this 11th day of September, 1990. 
FOR THF rffljPTV 
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Mary Ty Noonan 
Clerk of the Court 
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